Mind
From Philosophy Archive
Contents |
Overview
The question "What is the mind?" has been asked for millenia, and is one that still remains unanswered. Theories from Philosophy of Mind have, however, made some bold attempts.
Issues in Philosophy of Mind
The current scientific view is that a human brain is a purely physical biochemical machine, completely described by the laws of physics. Is this true? And if so, is the mind something more than merely a product of its parts, ie is there something unique to it so that it is not simply an extremely complicated physical system.
If the mind is a system of mental events, can that system be compared to the system of a human body in a physical form, or is it a system of some other, 'mental substance'. Another question commonly asked is whether mental properties (or states, or kinds, or [equivalently general term]) just are physical properties. Is the mental phenomenon we call 'pain' really just, say, firing C-fibers in the brain? This view is known as type-physicalism (or type-identity theory)
Reductionism is the view that each level of our view of the mind, (psychology is reducible to neurophysiology, which is in turn reducible to physics) is analagous to all the rest. Because of this, the mind can be viewed entirely as a physical system based in the laws of physics.
Functionalism is the view that mental states aren't physical, they are functional. This means that pain for example, isn't described by a physical pattern of neurons firing, but instead as a high level state with a function (to produce other mental behaviours, which wil l, for example, take a hand off of a hot plate).
We can also ask questions about the different specific cognitive processes, and of course we might ask what cognitive processes in general are supposed to be. In that case, we'd be asking what distinguishes a cognitive process from any other kind of process. That is another way of putting the mind-body problem. We can also ask a series of more specialized questions, about each individual cognitive process. We can get the answers through cognitive science.
Consciousness is awareness, especially of the self. An important question is whether consciousness can be reduced to, or explained in terms of, physical processes. Some believe there must be something more, usually some sort of spiritual essence. Others would point to empirical biological evidence. Chemicals for example alter brain chemistry in ways that have consistent & demonstrable effects. Many physical processes occur in the brain, and consciousness is an emergent property that is a synergetic result of those processes.
A final class of questions emerging from this aspect of philosophy concern the validity of the commonsense categories employed. Must it be the case that determinism rules out free will, or is it that one or both of these categories has been poorly defined? Does the rule against multiplication of entities force materialists to exclude higher-order entities such as semantic systems, or have we endowed 'material' with unwarranted properties? Is the term 'natural' meaningful if we deny that it has an opposite? What precisely is an event?
AQA Syllabus
The Mind and Body Problem
The problem of explaining the relationship between mentality and physicality. Is mentality dependent upon but distinct from the physical? Or is mentality physical? How dualist and materialist theories conceive the relationship between mind and body and how they explain, or explain away, the problem of mental causation. The utility, or otherwise, of consciousness as an explanatory concept. Can consciousness be reduced or dispensed with?
Approaches to Mentality and the Nature of Mind
The criteria for distinguishing mental states from physical states and the adequacy of these criteria: immediate, privileged and infallible access; qualia, feelings, images and sensations; intentionality, beliefs and aims. Theories concerning the nature of mind: substance and property dualism; materialist theories including behaviourism, identity theory, eliminative materialism, functionalism and biological naturalism. Polarities and tensions between these approaches, particularly those concerning subjectivity and naturalism: areas of overlap and compatibility.
Knowledge of Self and Self- Consciousness
Introspection as a source of knowledge: privacy and certainty, immediate and infallible accessibility. Can we begin from our own case? What role can conscious, conceived as private and subjective, experience have in explanations of the meaning of mental terms? How do we learn to self-ascribe? Could we be language users?
Knowledge of Others
Solipsism and the problem of other minds. The inaccessibility of others and the issue of the evidential criteria necessary for the ascription of mental states to others. Do some machines satisfy these criteria? Attempts to solve the problem, including arguments from analogy, behaviour-disposition accounts and criteriological arguments.
Persons
What is a person? The properties and powers necessary for selfhood. The problem of personal identity through time. Criteria for personal identity: bodily continuity, psychological continuity.
