Laws Book 10 - Plato

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BOOK X

And now having spoken of assaults, let us sum up all acts of 
violence under a single law, which shall be as follows:-No one shall 
take or carry away any of his neighbour's goods, neither shall he 
use anything which is his neighbour's without the consent of the 
owner; for these are the offences which are and have been, and will 
ever be, the source of all the aforesaid evils. The greatest of them 
are excesses and insolences of youth, and are offences against the 
greatest when they are done against religion; and especially great 
when in violation of public and holy rites, or of the partly-common 
rites in which tribes and phratries share; and in the second degree 
great when they are committed against private rites and sepulchres, 
and in the third degree (not to repeat the acts formerly mentioned), 
when insults are offered to parents; the fourth kind of violence is 
when any one, regardless of the authority of the rulers, takes or 
carries away or makes use of anything which belongs to them, not 
having their consent; and the fifth kind is when the violation of 
the civil rights of an individual demands reparation. There should 
be a common law embracing all these cases. For we have already said in 
general terms what shall be the punishment of sacrilege, whether 
fraudulent or violent, and now we have to determine what is to be 
the punishment of those who speak or act insolently toward the Gods. 
But first we must give them an admonition which may be in the 
following terms:-No one who in obedience to the laws believed that 
there were Gods, ever intentionally did any unholy act, or uttered any 
unlawful word; but he who did must have supposed one of three 
things-either that they did not exist,-which is the first possibility, 
or secondly, that, if they did, they took no care of man, or 
thirdly, that they were easily appeased and turned aside from their 
purpose, by sacrifices and prayers. 
Cleinias. What shall we say or do to these persons? 
Athenian Stranger. My good friend, let us first hear the jests which 
I suspect that they in their superiority will utter against us. 
Cle. What jests? 
Ath. They will make some irreverent speech of this sort:-"O 
inhabitants of Athens, and Sparta, and Cnosus," they will reply, "in 
that you speak truly; for some of us deny the very existence of the 
Gods, while others, as you say, are of opinion that they do not care 
about us; and others that they are turned from their course by 
gifts. Now we have a right to claim, as you yourself allowed, in the 
matter of laws, that before you are hard upon us and threaten us, 
you should argue with us and convince us-you should first attempt to 
teach and persuade us that there are Gods by reasonable evidences, and 
also that they are too good to be unrighteous, or to be propitiated, 
or turned from their course by gifts. For when we hear such things 
said of them by those who are esteemed to be the best of poets, and 
orators, and prophets, and priests, and by innumerable others, the 
thoughts of most of us are not set upon abstaining from unrighteous 
acts, but upon doing them and atoning for them. When lawgivers profess 
that they are gentle and not stern, we think that they should first of 
all use persuasion to us, and show us the existence of Gods, if not in 
a better manner than other men, at any rate in a truer; and who 
knows but that we shall hearken to you? If then our request is a 
fair one, please to accept our challenge." 
Cle. But is there any difficulty in proving the existence of the 
Gods? 
Ath. How would you prove it? 
Cle. How? In the first place, the earth and the sun, and the stars 
and the universe, and the fair order of the seasons, and the 
division of them into years and months, furnish proofs of their 
existence; and also there is the fact that all Hellenes and barbarians 
believe in them. 
Ath. I fear, my sweet friend, though I will not say that I much 
regard, the contempt with which the profane will be likely to assail 
us. For you do not understand the nature of their complaint, and you 
fancy that they rush into impiety only from a love of sensual 
pleasure. 
Cle. Why, Stranger, what other reason is there? 
Ath. One which you who live in a different atmosphere would never 
guess. 
Cle. What is it? 
Ath. A very grievous sort of ignorance which is imagined to be the 
greatest wisdom. 
Cle. What do you mean? 
Ath. At Athens there are tales preserved in writing which the virtue 
of your state, as I am informed, refuses to admit. They speak of the 
Gods in prose as well as verse, and the oldest of them tell of the 
origin of the heavens and of the world, and not far from the beginning 
of their story they proceed to narrate the birth of the Gods, and 
how after they were born they behaved to one another. Whether these 
stories have in other ways a good or a bad influence, I should not 
like to be severe upon them, because they are ancient; but, looking at 
them with reference to the duties of children to their parents, I 
cannot praise them, or think that they are useful, or at all true. 
Of the words of the ancients I have nothing more to say; and I 
should wish to say of them only what is pleasing to the Gods. But as 
to our younger generation and their wisdom, I cannot let them off when 
they do mischief. For do but mark the effect of their words: when 
you and I argue for the existence of the Gods, and produce the sun, 
moon, stars, and earth, claiming for them a divine being, if we 
would listen to the aforesaid philosophers we should say that they are 
earth and stones only, which can have no care at all of human affairs, 
and that all religion is a cooking up of words and a make-believe. 
Cle. One such teacher, O Stranger, would be bad enough, and you 
imply that there are many of them, which is worse. 
Ath. Well, then; what shall we say or do?-Shall we assume that 
some one is accusing us among unholy men, who are trying to escape 
from the effect of our legislation; and that they say of us-How 
dreadful that you should legislate on the supposition that there are 
Gods! Shall we make a defence of ourselves? or shall we leave them and 
return to our laws, lest the prelude should become longer than the 
law? For the discourse will certainly extend to great length, if we 
are to treat the impiously disposed as they desire, partly 
demonstrating to them at some length the things of which they demand 
an explanation, partly making them afraid or dissatisfied, and then 
proceed to the requisite enactments. 
Cle. Yes, Stranger; but then how often have we repeated already that 
on the present occasion there is no reason why brevity should be 
preferred to length; who is "at our heels"?-as the saying goes, and it 
would be paltry and ridiculous to prefer the shorter to the better. It 
is a matter of no small consequence, in some way or other to prove 
that there are Gods, and that they are good, and regard justice more 
than men do. The demonstration of this would be the best and noblest 
prelude of all our laws. And therefore, without impatience, and 
without hurry, let us unreservedly consider the whole matter, 
summoning up all the power of persuasion which we possess. 
Ath. Seeing you thus in earnest, I would fain offer up a prayer that 
I may succeed:-but I must proceed at once. Who can be calm when he 
is called upon to prove the existence of the Gods? Who can avoid 
hating and abhorring the men who are and have been the cause of this 
argument; I speak of those who will not believe the tales which they 
have heard as babes and sucklings from their mothers and nurses, 
repeated by them both in jest and earnest, like charms, who have 
also heard them in the sacrificial prayers, and seen sights 
accompanying them-sights and sounds delightful to children-and their 
parents during the sacrifices showing an intense earnestness on behalf 
of their children and of themselves, and with eager interest talking 
to the Gods, and beseeching them, as though they were firmly convinced 
of their existence; who likewise see and hear the prostrations and 
invocations which are made by Hellenes and barbarians at the rising 
and setting of the sun and moon, in all the vicissitudes of life, 
not as if they thought that there were no Gods, but as if there 
could be no doubt of their existence, and no suspicion of their 
non-existence; when men, knowing all these things, despise them on 
no real grounds, as would be admitted by all who have any particle 
of intelligence, and when they force us to say what we are now saying, 
how can any one in gentle terms remonstrate with the like of them, 
when he has to begin by proving to them the very existence of the 
Gods? Yet the attempt must be made; for it would be unseemly that 
one half of mankind should go mad in their lust of pleasure, and the 
other half in their indignation at such persons. Our address to 
these lost and perverted natures should not be spoken in passion; 
let us suppose ourselves to select some one of them, and gently reason 
with him, smothering our anger:-O my son, we will say to him, you 
are young, and the advance of time will make you reverse may of the 
opinions which you now hold. Wait awhile, and do not attempt to 
judge at present of the highest things; and that is the highest of 
which you now think nothing-to know the Gods rightly and to live 
accordingly. And in the first place let me indicate to you one point 
which is of great importance, and about which I cannot be 
deceived:-You and your friends are not the first who have held this 
opinion about the Gods. There have always been persons more or less 
numerous who have had the same disorder. I have known many of them, 
and can tell you, that no one who had taken up in youth this 
opinion, that the Gods do not exist, ever continued in the same 
until he was old; the two other notions certainly do continue in 
some cases, but not in many; the notion, I mean, that the Gods 
exist, but take no heed of human things, and the other notion that 
they do take heed of them, but are easily propitiated with 
sacrifices and prayers. As to the opinion about the Gods which may 
some day become clear to you, I advise you go wait and consider if 
it be true or not; ask of others, and above all of the legislator. 
In the meantime take care that you do not offend against the Gods. For 
the duty of the legislator is and always will be to teach you the 
truth of these matters. 
Cle. Our address, Stranger, thus far, is excellent. 
Ath. Quite true, Megillus and Cleinias, but I am afraid that we have 
unconsciously lighted on a strange doctrine. 
Cle. What doctrine do you mean? 
Ath. The wisest of all doctrines, in the opinion of many. 
Cle. I wish that you would speak plainer. 
Ath. The doctrine that all things do become, have become, and will 
become, some by nature, some by art, and some by chance. 
Cle. Is not that true? 
Ath. Well, philosophers are probably right; at any rate we may as 
well follow in their track, and examine what is the meaning of them 
and their disciples. 
Cle. By all means. 
Ath. They say that the greatest and fairest things are the work of 
nature and of chance, the lesser of art, which, receiving from 
nature the greater and primeval creations, moulds and fashions all 
those lesser works which are generally termed artificial. 
Cle. How is that? 
Ath. I will explain my meaning still more clearly. They say that 
fire and water, and earth and air, all exist by nature and chance, and 
none of them by art, and that as to the bodies which come next in 
order-earth, and sun, and moon, and stars-they have been created by 
means of these absolutely inanimate existences. The elements are 
severally moved by chance and some inherent force according to certain 
affinities among them-of hot with cold, or of dry with moist, or of 
soft with hard, and according to all the other accidental admixtures 
of opposites which have been formed by necessity. After this fashion 
and in this manner the whole heaven has been created, and all that 
is in the heaven, as well as animals and all plants, and all the 
seasons come from these elements, not by the action of mind, as they 
say, or of any God, or from art, but as I was saying, by nature and 
chance only. Art sprang up afterwards and out of these, mortal and 
of mortal birth, and produced in play certain images and very 
partial imitations of the truth, having an affinity to one another, 
such as music and painting create and their companion arts. And 
there are other arts which have a serious purpose, and these 
co-operate with nature, such, for example, as medicine, and husbandry, 
and gymnastic. And they say that politics cooperate with nature, but 
in a less degree, and have more of art; also that legislation is 
entirely a work of art, and is based on assumptions which are not 
true. 
Cle. How do you mean? 
Ath. In the first place, my dear friend, these people would say that 
the Gods exist not by nature, but by art, and by the laws of states, 
which are different in different places, according to the agreement of 
those who make them; and that the honourable is one thing by nature 
and another thing by law, and that the principles of justice have no 
existence at all in nature, but that mankind are always disputing 
about them and altering them; and that the alterations which are 
made by art and by law have no basis in nature, but are of authority 
for the moment and at the time at which they are made.-These, my 
friends, are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers, which 
find a way into the minds of youth. They are told by them that the 
highest right is might, and in this way the young fall into impieties, 
under the idea that the Gods are not such as the law bids them 
imagine; and hence arise factions, these philosophers inviting them to 
lead a true life according to nature, that is, to live in real 
dominion over others, and not in legal subjection to them. 
Cle. What a dreadful picture, Stranger, have you given, and how 
great is the injury which is thus inflicted on young men to the ruin 
both of states and families! 
Ath. True, Cleinias; but then what should the lawgiver do when 
this evil is of long standing? should he only rise up in the state and 
threaten all mankind, proclaiming that if they will not say and 
think that the Gods are such as the law ordains (and this may be 
extended generally to the honourable, the just, and to all the highest 
things, and to all that relates to virtue and vice), and if they 
will not make their actions conform to the copy which the law gives 
them, then he who refuses to obey the law shall die, or suffer stripes 
and bonds, or privation of citizenship, or in some cases be punished 
by loss of property and exile? Should he not rather, when he is making 
laws for men, at the same time infuse the spirit of persuasion into 
his words, and mitigate the severity of them as far as he can? 
Cle. Why, Stranger, if such persuasion be at all possible, then a 
legislator who has anything in him ought never to weary of 
persuading men; he ought to leave nothing unsaid in support of the 
ancient opinion that there are Gods, and of all those other truths 
which you were just now mentioning; he ought to support the law and 
also art, and acknowledge that both alike exist by nature, and no less 
than nature, if they are the creations of mind in accordance with 
right reason, you appear to me to maintain, and I am disposed to agree 
with you in thinking. 
Ath. Yes, my enthusiastic Cleinias; but are not these things when 
spoken to a multitude hard to be understood, not to mention that 
they take up a dismal length of time? 
Cle. Why, Stranger, shall we, whose patience failed not when 
drinking or music were the themes of discourse, weary now of 
discoursing about the Gods, and about divine things? And the 
greatest help to rational legislation is that the laws when once 
written down are always at rest; they can be put to the test at any 
future time, and therefore, if on first hearing they seem difficult, 
there is no reason for apprehension about them, because any man 
however dull can go over them and consider them again and again; nor 
if they are tedious but useful, is there any reason or religion, as it 
seems to me, in any man refusing to maintain the principles of them to 
the utmost of his power. 
Megillus. Stranger, I like what Cleinias is saying. 
Ath. Yes, Megillus, and we should do as he proposes; for if 
impious discourses were not scattered, as I may say, throughout the 
world, there would have been no need for any vindication of the 
existence of the Gods-but seeing that they are spread far and wide, 
such arguments are needed; and who should come to the rescue of the 
greatest laws, when they are being undermined by bad men, but the 
legislator himself? 
Meg. There is no more proper champion of them. 
Ath. Well, then, tell me, Cleinias-for I must ask you to be my 
partner-does not he who talks in this way conceive fire and water 
and earth and air to be the first elements of all things? These he 
calls nature, and out of these he supposes the soul to be formed 
afterwards; and this is not a mere conjecture of ours about his 
meaning, but is what he really means. 
Cle. Very true. 
Ath. Then, by Heaven, we have discovered the source of this vain 
opinion of all those physical investigators; and I would have you 
examine their arguments with the utmost care, for their impiety is a 
very serious matter; they not only make a bad and mistaken use of 
argument, but they lead away the minds of others: that is my opinion 
of them. 
Cle. You are right; but I should like to know how this happens. 
Ath. I fear that the argument may seem singular. 
Cle. Do not hesitate, Stranger; I see that you are afraid of such 
a discussion carrying you beyond the limits of legislation. But if 
there be no other way of showing our agreement in the belief that 
there are Gods, of whom the law is said now to approve, let us take 
this way, my good sir. 
Ath. Then I suppose that I must repeat the singular argument of 
those who manufacture the soul according to their own impious notions; 
they affirm that which is the first cause of the generation and 
destruction of all things, to be not first, but last, and that which 
is last to be first, and hence they have fallen into error about the 
true nature of the Gods. 
Cle. Still I do not understand you. 
Ath. Nearly all of them, my friends, seem to be ignorant of the 
nature and power of the soul, especially in what relates to her 
origin: they do not know that she is among the first of things, and 
before all bodies, and is the chief author of their changes and 
transpositions. And if this is true, and if the soul is older than the 
body, must not the things which are of the soul's kindred be of 
necessity prior to those which appertain to the body? 
Cle. Certainly. 
Ath. Then thought and attention and mind and art and law will be 
prior to that which is hard and soft and heavy and light; and the 
great and primitive works and actions will be works of art; they 
will be the first, and after them will come nature and works of 
nature, which however is a wrong term for men to apply to them; 
these will follow, and will be under the government of art and mind. 
Cle. But why is the word "nature" wrong? 
Ath. Because those who use the term mean to say that nature is the 
first creative power; but if the soul turn out to be the primeval 
element, and not fire or air, then in the truest sense and beyond 
other things the soul may be said to exist by nature; and this would 
be true if you proved that the soul is older than the body, but not 
otherwise. 
Cle. You are quite right. 
Ath. Shall we, then, take this as the next point to which our 
attention should be directed? 
Cle. By all means. 
Ath. Let us be on our guard lest this most deceptive argument with 
its youthful looks, beguiling us old men, give us the slip and make 
a laughing-stock of us. Who knows but we may be aiming at the greater, 
and fail of attaining the lesser? Suppose that we three have to pass a 
rapid river, and I, being the youngest of the three and experienced in 
rivers, take upon me the duty of making the attempt first by myself; 
leaving you in safety on the bank, I am to examine whether the river 
is passable by older men like yourselves, and if such appears to be 
the case then I shall invite you to follow, and my experience will 
help to convey you across; but if the river is impassable by you, then 
there will have been no danger to anybody but myself-would not that 
seem to be a very fair proposal? I mean to say that the argument in 
prospect is likely to be too much for you, out of your depth and 
beyond your strength, and I should be afraid that the stream of my 
questions might create in you who are not in the habit of answering, 
giddiness and confusion of mind, and hence a feeling of unpleasantness 
and unsuitableness might arise. I think therefore that I had better 
first ask the questions and then answer them myself while you listen 
in safety; in that way I can carry on the argument until I have 
completed the proof that the soul is prior to the body. 
Cle. Excellent, Stranger, and I hope that you will do as you 
propose. 
Ath. Come, then, and if ever we are to call upon the Gods, let us 
call upon them now in all seriousness to come to the demonstration 
of their own existence. And so holding fast to the rope we will 
venture upon the depths of the argument. When questions of this sort 
are asked of me, my safest answer would appear to be as 
follows:-Some one says to me, "O Stranger, are all things at rest 
and nothing in motion, or is the exact opposite of this true, or are 
some things in motion and others at rest?-To this I shall reply that 
some things are in motion and others at rest. "And do not things which 
move a place, and are not the things which are at rest at rest in a 
place?" Certainly. "And some move or rest in one place and some in 
more places than one?" You mean to say, we shall rejoin, that those 
things which rest at the centre move in one place, just as the 
circumference goes round of globes which are said to be at rest? 
"Yes." And we observe that, in the revolution, the motion which 
carries round the larger and the lesser circle at the same time is 
proportionally distributed to greater and smaller, and is greater 
and smaller in a certain proportion. Here is a wonder which might be 
thought an impossibility, that the same motion should impart swiftness 
and slowness in due proportion to larger and lesser circles. "Very 
true." And when you speak of bodies moving in many places, you seem to 
me to mean those which move from one place to another, and sometimes 
have one centre of motion and sometimes more than one because they 
turn upon their axis; and whenever they meet anything, if it be 
stationary, they are divided by it; but if they get in the midst 
between bodies which are approaching and moving towards the same 
spot from opposite directions, they unite with them. "I admit the 
truth of what you are saying." Also when they unite they grow, and 
when they are divided they waste away-that is, supposing the 
constitution of each to remain, or if that fails, then there is a 
second reason of their dissolution. "And when are all things created 
and how?" Clearly, they are created when the first principle 
receives increase and attains to the second dimension, and from this 
arrives at the one which is neighbour to this, and after reaching 
the third becomes perceptible to sense. Everything which is thus 
changing and moving is in process of generation; only when at rest has 
it real existence, but when passing into another state it is destroyed 
utterly. Have we not mentioned all motions that there are, and 
comprehended them under their kinds and numbered them with the 
exception, my friends, of two? 
Cle. Which are they? 
Ath. Just the two, with which our present enquiry is concerned. 
Cle. Speak plainer. 
Ath. I suppose that our enquiry has reference to the soul? 
Cle. Very true. 
Ath. Let us assume that there is a motion able to move other things, 
but not to move itself;-that is one kind; and there is another kind 
which can move itself as well as other things, working in 
composition and decomposition, by increase and diminution and 
generation and destruction-that is also one of the many kinds of 
motion. 
Cle. Granted. 
Ath. And we will assume that which moves other, and is changed by 
other, to be the ninth, and that which changes itself and others, 
and is co-incident with every action and every passion, and is the 
true principle of change and motion in all that is-that we shall be 
inclined to call the tenth. 
Cle. Certainly. 
Ath. And which of these ten motions ought we to prefer as being 
the mightiest and most efficient? 
Cle. I must say that the motion which is able to move itself is 
ten thousand times superior to all the others. 
Ath. Very good; but may I make one or two corrections in what I have 
been saying? 
Cle. What are they? 
Ath. When I spoke of the tenth sort of motion, that was not quite 
correct. 
Cle. What was the error? 
Ath. According to the true order, the tenth was really the first 
in generation and power; then follows the second, which was 
strangely enough termed the ninth by us. 
Cle. What do you mean? 
Ath. I mean this: when one thing changes another, and that 
another, of such will there be any primary changing element? How can a 
thing which is moved by another ever be the beginning of change? 
Impossible. But when the self-moved changes other, and that again 
other, and thus thousands upon tens of thousands of bodies are set 
in motion, must not the beginning of all this motion be the change 
of the self-moving principle? 
Cle. Very true, and I quite agree. 
Ath. Or, to put the question in another way, making answer to 
ourselves:-If, as most of these philosophers have the audacity to 
affirm, all things were at rest in one mass, which of the 
above-mentioned principles of motion would first spring up among them? 
Cle. Clearly the self-moving; for there could be no change in them 
arising out of any external cause; the change must first take place in 
themselves. 
Ath. Then we must say that self-motion being the origin of all 
motions, and the first which arises among things at rest as well as 
among things in motion, is the eldest and mightiest principle of 
change, and that which is changed by another and yet moves other is 
second. 
Cle. Quite true. 
Ath. At this stage of the argument let us put a question. 
Cle. What question? 
Ath. If we were to see this power existing in any earthy, watery, or 
fiery substance, simple or compound-how should we describe it? 
Cle. You mean to ask whether we should call such a self-moving power 
life? 
Ath. I do. 
Cle. Certainly we should. 
Ath. And when we see soul in anything, must we not do the 
same-must we not admit that this is life? 
Cle. We must. 
Ath. And now, I beseech you, reflect;-you would admit that we have a 
threefold knowledge of things? 
Cle. What do you mean? 
Ath. I mean that we know the essence, and that we know the 
definition of the essence, and the name,-these are the three; and 
there are two questions which may be raised about anything. 
Cle. How two? 
Ath. Sometimes a person may give the name and ask the definition; or 
he may give the definition and ask the name. I may illustrate what I 
mean in this way. 
Cle. How? 
Ath. Number like some other things is capable of being divided 
into equal parts; when thus divided, number is named "even," and the 
definition of the name "even" is "number divisible into two equal 
parts"? 
Cle. True. 
Ath. I mean, that when we are asked about the definition and give 
the name, or when we are asked about the name and give the 
definition-in either case, whether we give name or definition, we 
speak of the same thing, calling "even" the number which is divided 
into two equal parts. 
Cle. Quite true. 
Ath. And what is the definition of that which is named "soul"? Can 
we conceive of any other than that which has been already given-the 
motion which can move itself? 
Cle. You mean to say that the essence which is defined as the 
self-moved is the same with that which has the name soul? 
Ath. Yes; and if this is true, do we still maintain that there is 
anything wanting in the proof that the soul is the first origin and 
moving power of all that is, or has become, or will be, and their 
contraries, when she has been clearly shown to be the source of change 
and motion in all things? 
Cle. Certainly not; the soul as being the source of motion, has been 
most satisfactorily shown to be the oldest of all things. 
Ath. And is not that motion which is produced in another, by 
reason of another, but never has any self-moving power at all, being 
in truth the change of an inanimate body, to be reckoned second, or by 
any lower number which you may prefer? 
Cle. Exactly. 
Ath. Then we are right, and speak the most perfect and absolute 
truth, when we say that the soul is prior to the body, and that the 
body is second and comes afterwards, and is born to obey the soul, 
which is the ruler? 
Cle. Nothing can be more true. 
Ath. Do you remember our old admission, that if the soul was prior 
to the body the things of the soul were also prior to those of the 
body? 
Cle. Certainly. 
Ath. Then characters and manners, and wishes and reasonings, and 
true opinions, and reflections, and recollections are prior to 
length and breadth and depth and strength of bodies, if the soul is 
prior to the body. 
Cle. To be sure. 
Ath. In the next place, must we not of necessity admit that the soul 
is the cause of good and evil, base and honourable, just and unjust, 
and of all other opposites, if we suppose her to be the cause of all 
things? 
Cle. We must. 
Ath. And as the soul orders and inhabits all things that move, 
however moving, must we not say that she orders also the heavens? 
Cle. Of course. 
Ath. One soul or more? More than one-I will answer for you; at any 
rate, we must not suppose that there are less than two-one the 
author of good, and the other of evil. 
Cle. Very true. 
Ath. Yes, very true; the soul then directs all things in heaven, and 
earth, and sea by her movements, and these are described by the 
terms-will, consideration, attention, deliberation, opinion true and 
false, joy and sorrow, confidence, fear, hatred, love, and other 
primary motions akin to these; which again receive the secondary 
motions of corporeal substances, and guide all things to growth and 
decay, to composition and decomposition, and to the qualities which 
accompany them, such as heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, 
hardness and softness, blackness and whiteness, bitterness and 
sweetness, and all those other qualities which the soul uses, 
herself a goddess, when truly receiving the divine mind she 
disciplines all things rightly to their happiness; but when she is the 
companion of folly, she does the very contrary of all this. Shall we 
assume so much, or do we still entertain doubts? 
Cle. There is no room at all for doubt. 
Ath. Shall we say then that it is the soul which controls heaven and 
earth, and the whole world?-that it is a principle of wisdom and 
virtue, or a principle which has neither wisdom nor virtue? Suppose 
that we make answer as follows:- 
Cle. How would you answer? 
Ath. If, my friend, we say that the whole path and movement of 
heaven, and of all that is therein, is by nature akin to the 
movement and revolution and calculation of mind, and proceeds by 
kindred laws, then, as is plain, we must say that the best soul 
takes care of the world and guides it along the good path. 
Cle. True. 
Ath. But if the world moves wildly and irregularly, then the evil 
soul guides it. 
Cle. True again. 
Ath. Of what nature is the movement of mind?-To this question it 
is not easy to give an intelligent answer; and therefore I ought to 
assist you in framing one. 
Cle. Very good. 
Ath. Then let us not answer as if we would look straight at the sun, 
making ourselves darkness at midday-I mean as if we were under the 
impression that we could see with mortal eyes, or know adequately 
the nature of mind;-it will be safer to look at the image only. 
Cle. What do you mean? 
Ath. Let us select of the ten motions the one which mind chiefly 
resembles; this I will bring to your recollection, and will then 
make the answer on behalf of us all. 
Cle. That will be excellent. 
Ath. You will surely remember our saying that all things were either 
at rest or in motion? 
Cle. I do. 
Ath. And that of things in motion some were moving in one place, and 
others in more than one? 
Cle. Yes. 
Ath. Of these two kinds of motion, that which moves in one place 
must move about a centre like globes made in a lathe, and is most 
entirely akin and similar to the circular movement of mind. 
Cle. What do you mean? 
Ath. In saying that both mind and the motion which is in one place 
move in the same and like manner, in and about the same, and in 
relation to the same, and according to one proportion and order, and 
are like the motion of a globe, we invented a fair image, which does 
no discredit to our ingenuity. 
Cle. It does us great credit. 
Ath. And the motion of the other sort which is not after the same 
manner, nor in the same, nor about the same, nor in relation to the 
same, nor in one place, nor in order, nor according to any rule or 
proportion, may be said to be akin to senselessness and folly? 
Cle. That is most true. 
Ath. Then, after what has been said, there is no difficulty in 
distinctly stating, that since soul carries all things round, either 
the best soul or the contrary must of necessity carry round and 
order and arrange the revolution of the heaven. 
Cle. And judging from what has been said, Stranger, there would be 
impiety in asserting that any but the most perfect soul or souls 
carries round the heavens. 
Ath. You have understood my meaning right well, Cleinias, and now 
let me ask you another question. 
Cle. What are you going to ask? 
Ath. If the soul carries round the sun and moon, and the other 
stars, does she not carry round each individual of them? 
Cle. Certainly. 
Ath. Then of one of them let us speak, and the same argument will 
apply to all. 
Cle. Which will you take? 
Ath. Every one sees the body of the sun, but no one sees his soul, 
nor the soul of any other body living or dead; and yet there is 
great reason to believe that this nature, unperceived by any of our 
senses, is circumfused around them all, but is perceived by mind; 
and therefore by mind and reflection only let us apprehend the 
following point. 
Cle. What is that? 
Ath. If the soul carries round the sun, we shall not be far wrong in 
supposing one of three alternatives. 
Cle. What are they? 
Ath. Either the soul which moves the sun this way and that, 
resides within the circular and visible body, like the soul which 
carries us about every way; or the soul provides herself with an 
external body of fire or air, as some affirm, and violently propels 
body by body; or thirdly, she is without such abody, but guides the 
sun by some extraordinary and wonderful power. 
Cle. Yes, certainly; the soul can only order all things in one of 
these three ways. 
Ath. And this soul of the sun, which is therefore better than the 
sun, whether taking the sun about in a chariot to give light to men, 
or acting from without or in whatever way, ought by every man to be 
deemed a God. 
Cle. Yes, by every man who has the least particle of sense. 
Ath. And of the stars too, and of the moon, and of the years and 
months and seasons, must we not say in like manner, that since a 
soul or souls having every sort of excellence are the causes of all of 
them, those souls are Gods, whether they are living beings and 
reside in bodies, and in this way order the whole heaven, or 
whatever be the place and mode of their existence;-and will any one 
who admits all this venture to deny that all things full of Gods? 
Cle. No one, Stranger, would be such a madman. 
Ath. And now, Megillus and Cleinias, let us offer terms to him who 
has hitherto denied the existence of the Gods, and leave him. 
Cle. What terms? 
Ath. Either he shall teach us that we were wrong in saying that 
the soul is the original of all things, and arguing accordingly; or, 
if he be not able to say anything better, then he must yield to us and 
live for the remainder of his life in the belief that there are 
Gods.-Let us see, then, whether we have said enough or not enough to 
those who deny that there are Gods. 
Cle. Certainly-quite enough, Stranger. 
Ath. Then to them we will say no more. And now we are to address him 
who, believing that there are Gods, believes also that they take no 
heed of human affairs: To him we say-O thou best of men, in 
believing that there are Gods you are led by some affinity to them, 
which attracts you towards your kindred and makes you honour and 
believe in them. But the fortunes of evil and unrighteous men in 
private as well as public life, which, though not really happy, are 
wrongly counted happy in the judgment of men, and are celebrated 
both by poets and prose writers-these draw you aside from your natural 
piety. Perhaps you have seen impious men growing old and leaving their 
children's children in high offices, and their prosperity shakes 
your faith-you have known or heard or been yourself an eyewitness of 
many monstrous impieties, and have beheld men by such criminal 
means from small beginnings attaining to sovereignty and the 
pinnacle of greatness; and considering all these things you do not 
like to accuse the Gods of them, because they are your relatives; 
and so from some want of reasoning power, and also from an 
unwillingness to find fault with them, you have come to believe that 
they exist indeed, but have no thought or care of human things. Now, 
that your present evil opinion may not grow to still greater 
impiety, and that we may if possible use arguments which may conjure 
away the evil before it arrives, we will add another argument to 
that originally addressed to him who utterly denied the existence of 
the Gods. And do you, Megillus and Cleinias, answer for the young 
man as you did before; and if any impediment comes in our way, I 
will take the word out of your mouths, and carry you over the river as 
I did just now. 
Cle. Very good; do as you say, and we will help you as well as we 
can. 
Ath. There will probably be no difficulty in proving to him that the 
Gods care about the small as well as about the great. For he was 
present and heard what was said, that they are perfectly good, and 
that the care of all things is most entirely natural to them. 
Cle. No doubt he heard that. 
Ath. Let us consider together in the next place what we mean by this 
virtue which we ascribe to them. Surely we should say that to be 
temperate and to possess mind belongs to virtue, and the contrary to 
vice? 
Cle. Certainly. 
Ath. Yes; and courage is a part of virtue, and cowardice of vice? 
Cle. True. 
Ath. And the one is honourable, and the other dishonourable? 
Cle. To be sure. 
Ath. And the one, like other meaner things, is a human quality, 
but the Gods have no part in anything of the sort? 
Cle. That again is what everybody will admit. 
Ath. But do we imagine carelessness and idleness and luxury to be 
virtues? What do you think? 
Cle. Decidedly not. 
Ath. They rank under the opposite class? 
Cle. Yes. 
Ath. And their opposites, therefore, would fall under the opposite 
class? 
Cle. Yes. 
Ath. But are we to suppose that one who possesses all these good 
qualities will be luxurious and heedless and idle, like those whom the 
poet compares to stingless drones? 
Cle. And the comparison is a most just one. 
Ath. Surely God must not be supposed to have a nature which he 
himself hates?-he who dares to say this sort of thing must not be 
tolerated for a moment. 
Cle. Of course not. How could he have? 
Ath. Should we not on any principle be entirely mistaken in praising 
any one who has some special business entrusted to him, if he have a 
mind which takes care of great matters and no care of small ones? 
Reflect; he who acts in this way, whether he be God or man, must act 
from one of two principles. 
Cle. What are they? 
Ath. Either he must think that the neglect of the small matters is 
of no consequence to the whole, or if he knows that they are of 
consequence, and he neglects them, his neglect must be attributed to 
carelessness and indolence. Is there any other way in which his 
neglect can be explained? For surely, when it is impossible for him to 
take care of all, he is not negligent if he fails to attend to these 
things great or small, which a God or some inferior being might be 
wanting in strength or capacity to manage? 
Cle. Certainly not. 
Ath. Now, then, let us examine the offenders, who both alike confess 
that there are Gods, but with a difference-the one saying that they 
may be appeased, and the other that they have no care of small 
matters: there are three of us and two of them, and we will say to 
them-In the first place, you both acknowledge that the Gods hear and 
see and know all things, and that nothing can escape them which is 
matter of sense and knowledge:-do you admit this? 
Cle. Yes. 
Ath. And do you admit also that they have all power which mortals 
and immortals can have? 
Cle. They will, of course, admit this also. 
Ath. And surely we three and they two-five in all-have 
acknowledged that they are good and perfect? 
Cle. Assuredly. 
Ath. But, if they are such as we conceive them to be, can we 
possibly suppose that they ever act in the spirit of carelessness 
and indolence? For in us inactivity is the child of cowardice, and 
carelessness of inactivity and indolence. 
Cle. Most true. 
Ath. Then not from inactivity and carelessness is any God ever 
negligent; for there is no cowardice in them. 
Cle. That is very true. 
Ath. Then the alternative which remains is, that if the Gods neglect 
the lighter and lesser concerns of the universe, they neglect them 
because they know that they ought not to care about such 
matters-what other alternative is there but the opposite of their 
knowing? 
Cle. There is none. 
Ath. And, O most excellent and best of men, do I understand you to 
mean that they are careless because they are ignorant, and do not know 
that they ought to take care, or that they know, and yet like the 
meanest sort of men, knowing the better, choose the worse because they 
are overcome by pleasures and pains? 
Cle. Impossible. 
Ath. Do not all human things partake of the nature of soul? And is 
not man the most religious of all animals? 
Cle. That is not to be denied. 
Ath. And we acknowledge that all mortal creatures are the property 
of the Gods, to whom also the whole of heaven belongs? 
Cle. Certainly. 
Ath. And, therefore, whether a person says that these things are 
to the Gods great or small-in either case it would not be natural 
for the Gods who own us, and who are the most careful and the best 
of owners to neglect us.-There is also a further consideration. 
Cle. What is it? 
Ath. Sensation and power are in an inverse ratio to each other in 
respect to their case and difficulty. 
Cle. What do you mean? 
Ath. I mean that there is greater difficulty in seeing and hearing 
the small than the great, but more facility in moving and 
controlling and taking care of and unimportant things than of their 
opposites. 
Cle. Far more. 
Ath. Suppose the case of a physician who is willing and able to cure 
some living thing as a whole-how will the whole fare at his hands if 
he takes care only of the greater and neglects the parts which are 
lesser? 
Cle. Decidedly not well. 
Ath. No better would be the result with pilots or generals, or 
householders or statesmen, or any other such class, if they 
neglected the small and regarded only the great;-as the builders 
say, the larger stones do not lie well without the lesser. 
Cle. Of course not. 
Ath. Let us not, then, deem God inferior to human workmen, who, in 
proportion to their skill, finish and perfect their works, small as 
well as great, by one and the same art; or that God, the wisest of 
beings, who is both willing and able to take care, is like a lazy 
good-for-nothing, or a coward, who turns his back upon labour and 
gives no thought to smaller and easier matters, but to the greater 
only. 
Cle. Never, Stranger, let us admit a supposition about the Gods 
which is both impious and false. 
Ath. I think that we have now argued enough with him who delights to 
accuse the Gods of neglect. 
Cle. Yes. 
Ath. He has been forced to acknowledge that he is in error, but he 
still seems to me to need some words of consolation. 
Cle. What consolation will you offer him? 
Ath. Let us say to the youth:-The ruler of the universe has 
ordered all things with a view to the excellence and preservation of 
the whole, and each part, as far as may be, has an action and 
passion appropriate to it. Over these, down to the least fraction of 
them, ministers have been appointed to preside, who have wrought out 
their perfection with infinitesimal exactness. And one of these 
portions of the universe is thine own, unhappy man, which, however 
little, contributes to the whole; and you do not seem to be aware that 
this and every other creation is for the sake of the whole, and in 
order that the life of the whole may be blessed; and that you are 
created for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of 
you. For every physician and every skilled artist does all things 
for the sake of the whole, directing his effort towards the common 
good, executing the part for the sake of the whole, and not the 
whole for the sake of the part. And you are annoyed because you are 
ignorant how what is best for you happens to you and to the 
universe, as far as the laws of the common creation admit. Now, as the 
soul combining first with one body and then with another undergoes all 
sorts of changes, either of herself, or through the influence of 
another soul, all that remains to the player of the game is that he 
should shift the pieces; sending the better nature to the better 
place, and the worse to the worse, and so assigning to them their 
proper portion. 
Cle. In what way do you mean? 
Ath. In a way which may be supposed to make the care of all things 
easy to the Gods. If any one were to form or fashion all things 
without any regard to the whole-if, for example, he formed a living 
element of water out of fire, instead of forming many things out of 
one or one out of many in regular order attaining to a first or second 
or third birth, the transmutation would have been infinite; but now 
the ruler of the world has a wonderfully easy task. 
Cle. How so? 
Ath. I will explain:-When the king saw that our actions had life, 
and that there was much virtue in them and much vice, and that the 
soul and body, although not, like the Gods of popular opinion, 
eternal, yet having once come into existence, were indestructible (for 
if either of them had been destroyed, there would have been no 
generation of living beings); and when he observed that the good of 
the soul was ever by nature designed to profit men, and the evil to 
harm them-he, seeing all this, contrived so to place each of the parts 
that their position might in the easiest and best manner procure the 
victory of good and the defeat of evil in the whole. And he 
contrived a general plan by which a thing of a certain nature found 
a certain seat and room. But the formation of qualities he left to the 
wills of individuals. For every one of us is made pretty much what 
he is by the bent of his desires and the nature of his soul. 
Cle. Yes, that is probably true. 
Ath. Then all things which have a soul change, and possess in 
themselves a principle of change, and in changing move according to 
law and to the order of destiny: natures which have undergone a lesser 
change move less and on the earth's surface, but those which have 
suffered more change and have become more criminal sink into the 
abyss, that is to say, into Hades and other places in the world below, 
of which the very names terrify men, and which they picture to 
themselves as in a dream, both while alive and when released from 
the body. And whenever the soul receives more of good or evil from her 
own energy and the strong influence of others-when she has communion 
with divine virtue and becomes divine, she is carried into another and 
better place, which is perfect in holiness; but when she has communion 
with evil, then she also changes the Place of her life. 
This is the justice of the Gods who inhabit Olympus. 
O youth or young man, who fancy that you are neglected by the Gods, 
know that if you become worse you shall go to the worse souls, or if 
better to the better, and in every succession of life and death you 
will do and suffer what like may fitly suffer at the hands of like. 
This is the justice of heaven, which neither you nor any other 
unfortunate will ever glory in escaping, and which the ordaining 
powers have specially ordained; take good heed thereof, for it will be 
sure to take heed of you. If you say:-I am small and will creep into 
the depths of the earth, or I am high and will fly up to heaven, you 
are not so small or so high but that you shall pay the fitting 
penalty, either here or in the world below or in some still more 
savage place whither you shall be conveyed. This is also the 
explanation of the fate of those whom you saw, who had done unholy and 
evil deeds, and from small beginnings had grown great, and you fancied 
that from being miserable they had become happy; and in their actions, 
as in a mirror, you seemed to see the universal neglect of the Gods, 
not knowing how they make all things work together and contribute to 
the great whole. And thinkest thou, bold man, that thou needest not to 
know this?-he who knows it not can never form any true idea of the 
happiness or unhappiness of life or hold any rational discourse 
respecting either. If Cleinias and this our reverend company succeed 
in bringing to you that you know not what you say of the Gods, then 
will God help you; but should you desire to hear more, listen to 
what we say to the third opponent, if you have any understanding 
whatsoever. For I think that we have sufficiently proved the existence 
of the Gods, and that they care for men:-The other notion that they 
are appeased by the wicked, and take gifts, is what we must not 
concede to any one, and what every man should disprove to the utmost 
of his power. 
Cle. Very good; let us do as you say. 
Ath. Well, then, by the Gods themselves I conjure you to tell 
me-if they are to be propitiated, how are they to be propitiated? 
Who are they, and what is their nature? Must they not be at least 
rulers who have to order unceasingly the whole heaven? 
Cle. True. 
Ath. And to what earthly rulers can they be compared, or who to 
them? How in the less can we find an image of the greater? Are they 
charioteers of contending pairs of steeds, or pilots of vessels? 
Perhaps they might be compared to the generals of armies, or they 
might be likened to physicians providing against the diseases which 
make war upon the body, or to husbandmen observing anxiously the 
effects of the seasons on the growth of plants; or I perhaps, to 
shepherds of flocks. For as we acknowledge the world to be full of 
many goods and also of evils, and of more evils than goods, there 
is, as we affirm, an immortal conflict going on among us, which 
requires marvellous watchfulness; and in that conflict the Gods and 
demigods are our allies, and we are their property. Injustice and 
insolence and folly are the destruction of us, and justice and 
temperance and wisdom are our salvation; and the place of these latter 
is in the life of the Gods, although some vestige of them may 
occasionally be discerned among mankind. But upon this earth we know 
that there dwell souls possessing an unjust spirit, who may be 
compared to brute animals, which fawn upon their keepers, whether dogs 
or shepherds, or the best and most perfect masters; for they in like 
manner, as the voices of the wicked declare, prevail by flattery and 
prayers and incantations, and are allowed to make their gains with 
impunity. And this sin, which is termed dishonesty, is an evil of 
the same kind as what is termed disease in living bodies or pestilence 
in years or seasons of the year, and in cities and governments has 
another name, which is injustice. 
Cle. Quite true. 
Ath. What else can he say who declares that the Gods are always 
lenient to the doers of unjust acts, if they divide the spoil with 
them? As if wolves were to toss a portion of their prey to the dogs, 
and they, mollified by the gift, suffered them to tear the flocks. 
Must not he who maintains that the Gods can be propitiated argue thus? 
Cle. Precisely so. 
Ath. And to which of the above-mentioned classes of guardians 
would any man compare the Gods without absurdity? Will he say that 
they are like pilots, who are themselves turned away from their duty 
by "libations of wine and the savour of fat," and at last overturn 
both ship and sailors? 
Cle. Assuredly not. 
Ath. And surely they are not like charioteers who are bribed to give 
up the victory to other chariots? 
Cle. That would be a fearful image of the Gods. 
Ath. Nor are they like generals, or physicians, or husbandmen, or 
shepherds; and no one would compare them to dogs who have silenced 
by wolves. 
Cle. A thing not to be spoken of. 
Ath. And are not all the Gods the chiefest of all guardians, and 
do they not guard our highest interests? 
Cle. Yes; the chiefest. 
Ath. And shall we say that those who guard our noblest interests, 
and are the best of guardians, are inferior in virtue to dogs, and 
to men even of moderate excellence, who would never betray justice for 
the sake of gifts which unjust men impiously offer them? 
Cle. Certainly not: nor is such a notion to be endured, and he who 
holds this opinion may be fairly singled out and characterized as of 
all impious men the wickedest and most impious. 
Ath. Then are the three assertions-that the Gods exist, and that 
they take care of men, and that they can never be persuaded to do 
injustice, now sufficiently demonstrated? May we say that they are? 
Cle. You have our entire assent to your words. 
Ath. I have spoken with vehemence because I am zealous against 
evil men; and I will tell dear Cleinias, why I am so. I would not have 
the wicked think that, having the superiority in argument, they may do 
as they please and act according to their various imaginations about 
the Gods; and this zeal has led me to speak too vehemently; but if 
we have at all succeeded in persuading the men to hate themselves 
and love their opposites, the prelude of our laws about impiety will 
not have been spoken in vain. 
Cle. So let us hope; and even if we have failed, the style of our 
argument will not discredit the lawgiver. 
Ath. After the prelude shall follow a discourse, which will be the 
interpreter of the law; this shall proclaim to all impious 
persons:-that they must depart from their ways and go over to the 
pious. And to those who disobey, let the law about impiety be as 
follows:-If a man is guilty of any impiety in word or deed, any one 
who happens to present shall give information to the magistrates, in 
aid of the law; and let the magistrates who. first receive the 
information bring him before the appointed court according to the law; 
and if a magistrate, after receiving information, refuses to act, he 
shall be tried for impiety at the instance of any one who is willing 
to vindicate the laws; and if any one be cast, the court shall 
estimate the punishment of each act of impiety; and let all such 
criminals be imprisoned. There shall be three prisons in the state: 
the first of them is to be the common prison in the neighbourhood of 
the agora for the safe-keeping of the generality of offenders; another 
is to be in the neighbourhood of the nocturnal council, and is to be 
called the "House of Reformation"; another, to be situated in some 
wild and desolate region in the centre of the country, shall be called 
by some name expressive of retribution. Now, men fall into impiety 
from three causes, which have been already mentioned, and from each of 
these causes arise two sorts of impiety, in all six, which are worth 
distinguishing, and should not all have the same punishment. For he 
who does not believe in Gods, and yet has a righteous nature, hates 
the wicked and dislikes and refuses to do injustice, and avoids 
unrighteous men, and loves the righteous. But they who besides 
believing that the world is devoid of Gods are intemperate, and have 
at the same time good memories and quick wits, are worse; although 
both of them are unbelievers, much less injury is done by the one than 
by the other. The one may talk loosely about the Gods and about 
sacrifices and oaths, and perhaps by laughing at other men he may make 
them like himself, if he be not punished. But the other who holds 
the same opinions and is called a clever man, is full of stratagem and 
deceit-men of this class deal in prophecy and jugglery of all kinds, 
and out of their ranks sometimes come tyrants and demagogues and 
generals and hierophants of private mysteries and the Sophists, as 
they are termed, with their ingenious devices. There are many kinds of 
unbelievers, but two only for whom legislation is required; one the 
hypocritical sort, whose crime is deserving of death many times 
over, while the other needs only bonds and admonition. In like 
manner also the notion that the Gods take no thought of men produces 
two other sorts of crimes, and the notion that they may be propitiated 
produces two more. Assuming these divisions, let those who have been 
made what they are only from want of understanding, and not from 
malice or an evil nature, be placed by the judge in the House of 
Reformation, and ordered to suffer imprisonment during a period of not 
less than five years. And in the meantime let them have no intercourse 
with the other citizens, except with members of the nocturnal council, 
and with them let them converse with a view to the improvement of 
their soul's health. And when the time of their imprisonment has 
expired, if any of them be of sound mind let him be restored to sane 
company, but if not, and if he be condemned a second time, let him 
be punished with death. As to that class of monstrous natures who 
not only believe that there are no Gods, or that they are negligent, 
or to be propitiated, but in contempt of mankind conjure the souls 
of the living and say that they can conjure the dead and promise to 
charm the Gods with sacrifices and prayers, and will utterly overthrow 
individuals and whole houses and states for the sake of money-let 
him who is guilty of any of these things be condemned by the court 
to be bound according to law in the prison which is in the centre of 
the land, and let no freeman ever approach him, but let him receive 
the rations of food appointed by the guardians of the law from the 
hands of the public slaves; and when he is dead let him be cast beyond 
the borders unburied, and if any freeman assist in burying him, let 
him pay the penalty of impiety to any one who is willing to bring a 
suit against him. But if he leaves behind him children who are fit 
to be citizens, let the guardians of orphans take care of them, just 
as they would of any other orphans, from the day on which their father 
is convicted. 
In all these cases there should be one law, which will make men in 
general less liable to transgress in word or deed, and less foolish, 
because they will not be allowed to practise religious rites 
contrary to law. And let this be the simple form of the law:-No man 
shall have sacred rites in a private house. When he would sacrifice, 
let him go to the temples and hand over his offerings to the priests 
and priestesses, who see to the sanctity of such things, and let him 
pray himself, and let any one who pleases join with him in prayer. The 
reason of this is as follows:-Gods and temples are not easily 
instituted, and to establish them rightly is the work of a mighty 
intellect. And women especially, and men too, when they are sick or in 
danger, or in any sort of difficulty, or again on their receiving 
any good fortune, have a way of consecrating the occasion, vowing 
sacrifices, and promising shrines to Gods, demigods, and sons of Gods; 
and when they are awakened by terrible apparitions and dreams or 
remember visions, they find in altars and temples the remedies of 
them, and will fill every house and village with them, placing them in 
the open air, or wherever they may have had such visions; and with a 
view to all these cases we should obey the law. The law has also 
regard to the impious, and would not have them fancy that by the 
secret performance of these actions-by raising temples and by building 
altars in private houses, they can propitiate the God secretly with 
sacrifices and prayers, while they are really multiplying their crimes 
infinitely, bringing guilt from heaven upon themselves, and also 
upon those who permit them, and who are better men than they are; 
and the consequence is that the whole state reaps the fruit of their 
impiety, which, in a certain sense, is deserved. Assuredly God will 
not blame the legislator, who will enact the following law:-No one 
shall possess shrines of the Gods in private houses, and he who is 
found to possess them, and perform any sacred rites not publicly 
authorized-supposing the offender to be some man or woman who is not 
guilty of any other great and impious crime-shall be informed 
against by him who is acquainted with the fact, which shall be 
announced by him to the guardians of the law; and let them issue 
orders that he or she shall carry away their private rites to the 
public temples, and if they do not persuade them, let them inflict a 
penalty on them until they comply. And if a person be proven guilty of 
impiety, not merely from childish levity, but such as grown-up men may 
be guilty of, whether he have sacrificed publicly or privately to 
any Gods, let him be punished with death, for his sacrifice is impure. 
Whether the deed has been done in earnest, or only from childish 
levity, let the guardians of the law determine, before they bring 
the matter into court and prosecute the offender for impiety. 

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